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The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of
information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation.
Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands
are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns
to scale. We characterize the Bertrand–Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing
equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that
competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition
reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create
in the long run.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, the fast penetration of the Internet and the
increased digitization of information goods like music, movies, and
software have turned the issue of piracy into a topic of intense debate.
Not surprisingly, economists have recently shown a renewed interest
in information goods piracy.1 Recent contributions revive the litera-
ture on the economics of copying and copyright, which was initiated
some 20 years ago.2 While early contributions focus on the effects of
photocopying and examined how publishers can indirectly appropriate
some revenues from illegitimate users (Novos and Waldman, 1984;
Liebowitz, 1985; Johnson, 1985; Besen and Kirby, 1989), later papers
concentrate on the intellectual property (IP) protection and discuss
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the trade-off between the ex ante benefit of preserving the intellectual
creation incentives and the ex post cost of the consequent restraint on the
use of those goods (Landes and Posner, 1989; Besen and Raskind, 1991;
and more recently Bae and Choi, 2006).3
Yet, the literature on the economics of copying abstracts away the
strategic interaction among producers of information goods. Indeed, all
the above-mentioned contributions focus on the study of monopolies,
with the exception of Johnson (1985) who considers price-taking produc-
ers of information goods. However, this perspective sharply contrasts
with the reality of information good industries where production deci-
sions are concentrated in the hands of a small number of major players.
The oligopolistic nature of those industries leaves economic observers
unsatisfied with the monopoly or price-taking representation of produc-
tion under the threat of copying. In particular, such a representation is
unable to relate to some important characteristics of information good
industries such as the recent consolidation phases4 and the existence of
price dispersion.5 The present paper aims to address those issues.
The aim of the present paper is to study the strategic interactions
among the producers of information goods in the presence of piracy. In
particular, we want to analyze how oligopolistic producers set the prices
of their information goods when users are able to purchase copying
devices and to copy the goods. We also want to investigate the ex ante
and ex post benefits of oligopolistic competition under this threat of
copying. We finally want to relate those results to those obtained under
the monopoly assumption (Bae and Choi, 2006) or under the perfect
competition assumption (Johnson, 1985).
3. From an ex ante point of view, IP protection preserves the incentive to create
information goods, which are inherently public goods. On the other hand, IP rights
encompass various potential inefficiencies from an ex post point of view. The protection
grants de facto monopoly rights, which generates the standard deadweight losses; also,
by inhibiting imitation, IP rights might limit the creators’ ability to borrow from, or build
upon, earlier works, and thereby increase the cost of producing new ideas.
4. In the music industry, the 50–50 joint venture of BMG and Sony was cleared in
2004 both by the FTC and by the European Commission (although, in July 2006, the
EU’s Court of First Instance threw out the previous approval, finding that regulators did
not sufficiently investigate whether the combination would create a monopoly). In the
software industry, in September 2005, Oracle Corporation acquired Siebel Systems just
one day after eBay acquired Skype. In the movie industry, Sony absorbed MGM and
United Artists studios in 2005.
5. For instance, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) observe prices for a matched set of 20
books and 20 CDs sold through conventional and Internet outlets, and report average
price differences ranging from 25% for books to 33% for CDs. For an updated measure
of price dispersion over a wider range of products (including computer software), see
the ongoing research project of Michael Baye, John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten on
http://www.nash-equilibrium.com/.
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Our modeling strategy is the following. As is usually done in the
literature, we consider information goods with independent content.6
All other things being equal, the demands for the (two, for simplicity)
goods would be independent. However, we allow consumers to make
lower-quality copies by using a technology that exhibits increasing
returns to scale. The copying technology appears thus as a common
substitute for the information goods. The main effect of such a common
substitute is to make the demands for the goods interdependent over
some range of prices. In particular, the goods become complementary
when their prices are similar enough and they remain independent
otherwise. More precisely, the demand function for a particular infor-
mation good typically exhibits three segments and two kinks. Each
segment corresponds to a different category of consumers. We call
these categories “buyers,” “copiers,” and “switchers.” For the first two
categories, the demand for a good does not depend on the price of the
other good: indeed, whatever the price of the other good, “buyers” buy
this other good and “copiers” copy this other good. In contrast, for
“switchers,” the best use of one good depends on the best use of the
other good: if they purchase (copy) one good, they also purchase (copy)
the other one. Therefore, the demand for one good depends on both
prices.
Using this framework, we contrast the behavior of a multiproduct
monopolist with the behavior of two Bertrand duopolists. We also
perform a welfare analysis, both from a static and from a dynamic
perspective. Our main results are the following.
As far as the multiproduct monopoly is concerned, we show that
the firm may set different prices for its goods. Actually, the multiproduct
monopolist may follow two strategies. The first strategy is to set close
prices and target the demand by switchers. The second strategy is to
set a high price and target the buyers in one market while setting a
low price and targetting copiers in the other market. It turns out that the
former strategy dominates the latter. The firm prefers to target switchers
for whom only the sum of the two prices matters. Therefore, prices are
neither unique nor symmetric. The monopolist might well set different
prices for the two goods although consumers value these goods exactly
in the same way. Yet, the two prices cannot be too distant so as to
avoid some consumers becoming buyers or copiers. This result can be
interpreted as a first explanation for a form of limited price dispersion,
confirming the empirical evidence.
6. Think, for instance, of software applications for games and word processing, or CD
recordings of classic and pop music.
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In a duopoly, the interaction between firms leads to interesting
properties. A firm’s best response to the price set by the competitor
can depict up to four different attitudes. Because the nature of the
marginal buyer suddenly changes as the competitor’s price rises, the
best-response function shows discontinuities and equilibria in pure
strategies cannot be guaranteed. Intuitively, the inexistence of equilibria
stems from the firms’ free-riding behavior with respect to the threat
of piracy. If all firms take this threat seriously and quote low prices
to accommodate consumers, then they set too low a price and there
exists an opportunity for any individual firm to raise its price while
keeping a sufficiently large demand and making a larger profit. Tech-
nically, increasing returns to scale in the copying technology introduce
nonconvexities in the profit functions and undermine the existence of a
market equilibrium.
Consequently, we have to distinguish between two regions of
parameters. The first region corresponds to a sufficiently large cost of
copying. In this region, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies. At this equilibrium, both firms target switchers and quote
identical prices. The interesting feature of this equilibrium is that the
duopolists set a higher price than the (average) price of a multiproduct
monopoly. This is so because the two goods are perfect complements
over the segment of demand corresponding to the switchers. We observe
thus a manifestation of the so-called “Cournot effect” (Cournot, 1838).
That is, the multiproduct monopolist has an incentive to decrease prices
further than the duopolists do because it realizes that decreasing the
price for one good increases demand for the other good by making
copying less attractive. Although Johnson (1985) briefly mentions this
effect, he does not analyze it in detail. As will be seen in the sequel,
the existence of complementarities for some price ranges is important
for understanding why the industry may not reach a single price
equilibrium.
In the second region of parameters, where the fixed cost of
copying is sufficiently low, an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to
exist. Yet, we show that a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists. Each firm quotes two prices with positive probabilities. As price
realizations may be different, we have an explanation for equilibrium
price dispersion. Noteworthy is the fact that this explanation does not
rely, as is often proposed in the literature, on asymmetric information
and search frictions (see, for instance, Varian, 1980; Baye and Morgan,
2001). It is also interesting to note that the expected price in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, though smaller than the price that would prevail
in the pure-strategy equilibrium, remains above the average price set
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by a multiproduct monopolist. The Cournot effect eases but does not
disappear.
Finally, we perform a welfare analysis. Considering first ex post
efficiency, we stress that industry concentration is welfare improving
in the present context. Because of the Cournot effect, the multiprod-
uct monopoly leads to larger consumer and producer surpluses than
the duopoly. A merger is thus beneficial under the threat of copying
because it eliminates the negative externality resulting from the lack of
coordination about how firms should deter copying. This is a novel point
that has not yet been considered by antitrust agencies. We also assess
the effects of policy measures aiming at strengthening IP protection; we
show that increasing the cost of copying and decreasing the quality of
copies do not have the same qualitative effects. Considering next ex ante
efficiency, we compare our framework with an economy where only a
single information good is available. This exercise allows us to measure
the (gross) incentives to create a new information good. Whether those
incentives are larger for an entrant or for an incumbent firm is not clear
a priori. Indeed, the entrant’s incentives are reduced by the free-riding
effect observed in a duopoly, whereas the incumbent’s incentives are
reduced by a cannibalization effect (copying becomes more attractive as
the number of goods increases). Yet, we can conclude in our framework
that incentives to create are always higher for an entrant, that is, if the ex
post economy is organized as a duopoly. Therefore, although industry
concentration improves welfare from a static perspective, it reduces
welfare from a dynamic perspective. In other words, ex post competition
can be seen as a necessary evil that enhances ex ante incentives to create.
This conclusion turns on its head the traditional argument underlying IP
protection, which considers ex post monopoly—and not competition—
as the necessary evil.
To sum up, our main message is the following. The interactions
between producers of information goods under the threat of piracy
dramatically alter the equilibrium outcome compared to the outcome
obtained under a one-good monopoly setting. Equilibrium prices in
pure strategies may not exist and, if they do, they may be higher than
those in the one-good monopoly case. Inferences about dynamics and
welfare implications are not obvious anymore in oligopolistic industries.
For instance, industry concentration may enhance static efficiency while
being detrimental to dynamic efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
lay out the model and we derive the demand schedule for a particular
original. In Section 3, we characterize the two-good monopoly case.
In Section 4, we present the two-good duopoly case. In Section 5, we
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perform a welfare analysis. We conclude and propose an agenda for
future research in the last section.
2. Demand for Originals
There is a continuum of potential users who can consume at most
two information goods. These information goods are assumed to be
perfectly (horizontally) differentiated and equally valued by the users.
In particular, users are characterized by their valuation, θ , for any
information good. We assume that θ is uniformly distributed on the
interval [θ
¯
, θ¯ ], with θ
¯
> 0.
Each information good is imperfectly protected and thus “pirat-
able.” As a result, users can obtain each information good in two differ-
ent ways: they can either buy the copyrighted product (an “original”)
or make a copy of the product. It is reasonable to assume that all users
see the copy as a lower-quality alternative to the original.7 Therefore, in
the spirit of Mussa and Rosen (1978), we posit some vertical (quality)
differentiation between the two variants of any information good: letting
so and sc denote, respectively, the quality of an original and a copy, we
assume that 0 < sc < so.8 So, a user’s valuation of an original and a copy
is, respectively, θso and θsc. As a result, a user’s valuation of the extra
quality provided by an original (with respect to a copy) is θ (so − sc).
Thus, parameter θ also measures a user’s willingness to pay for the extra
quality provided by an original. As originals are perfectly horizontally
differentiated, it makes sense to consider that this willingness to pay
for extra quality does not depend on the very characteristics of the
information good. Therefore, if a user puts a higher premium on quality
than another user for good 1 (say a CD of classical music), she also puts
a higher premium on quality for good 2 (say a CD of rock music).9
As for the relative cost of originals and copies, we let pi denote
the price of original i (i = 1, 2) and we assume that users have access to
7. This assumption is common (see, e.g., Gayer and Shy, 2003) and may be justified
in several ways. In the case of analog reproduction, copies represent poor substitutes of
originals and are rather costly to distribute. Although this is no longer true for digital
reproduction, originals might still provide users with a higher level of services, insofar as
they are bundled with valuable complementary products, which can hardly be obtained
otherwise.
8. Similar models are used by Koboldt (1995) to consider commercial copying and by
Yoon (2002) and Bae and Choi (2006) to analyze the market for a single information good.
9. This specification implies that the preferences for the two goods are positively
correlated among users. This positive correlation clearly drives our results, but a negative
correlation seems to square hardly with real-life situations (why would users who put
a high premium on the original of one good systematically be those who put a low
premium on the original of the other good?). In addition, a more general specification
with independent valuations for the two goods makes the analysis untractable.
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a copying technology with increasing returns to scale. To keep things
simple, we assume that to be able to copy, consumers must incur a fixed
cost K > 0.10 Finally, for the sake of the exposition, we further assume that
all users prefer copying a single original over not using any information
good:
A1: θ
¯
sc − K ≥ 0.
Assumption A1 is likely to be satisfied in industries like music,
software, and video because, in the digital era, (1) the quality of copies
(sc) is high, (2) the fixed cost of copying (K) is low, and (3) users have
a high valuation (θ ) for information goods.11 This assumption greatly
simplifies the exposition whereas it retains the main properties of the
model.12 Indeed, it follows that all users will always consume both
goods, either by purchasing the original or by copying it.
The demand function for good i is therefore derived as follows.
One can write that a user with type θ buys original i iff,
θso − pi + max{θso − p j ; θsc − K }
≥ max{θso − p j + θsc − K ; 2θsc − K }. (1)
This inequality compares user θ ’s value of purchasing original i, and
either purchasing or copying good j, to the best option available given
that he or she does not purchase original i, namely, copying good i
whereas either buying or copying good j.
In the extreme case where K = 0 (copies are free), expression (1)
rewrites as
θso − pi + max{θso − p j ; θsc} ≥ θsc + max{θso − p j ; θsc}
⇐⇒ θ (so − sc) ≥ pi .
In that case, the demand for good i only depends on pi: the two goods
are independent.
10. For simplicity, we assume away the possibility for a user to share the copying
technology with N other users (e.g., within clubs or families). Yet, it can be shown that
the effect of sharing in groups of N users is equivalent to the effect of a decrease in the
cost of the copying technology from K to K/N. This equivalence holds provided that (1)
users form groups of the same size N; (2) all users within a particular group have the same
valuation θ ; and (3) users split the cost K equally within each group.
11. Another way to justify this assumption is to say that the fraction of users we choose
not to consider (i.e., those for whom θsc − K < 0) is constantly narrowing, as copying
devices become widely and cheaply available and as the “moral barrier” to illegal copying
is increasingly fading. The widespread use of copied music and software in less developed
countries corroborates this assumption.
12. Relaxing this assumption introduces additional complications in the analysis (i.e.,
additional kinks in the product demand and so, additional jumps in best response
functions), without bringing any further insight.
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However, for K > 0, increasing returns to scale in copying make the
demands interdependent. Inequality (1) can take three different forms,
each form corresponding to a specific category of users.
First, for high-valuation users such that θ (so − sc) ≥ pj, expression
(1) rewrites as
θso − pi + θso − p j ≥ θso − p j + θsc − K ⇐⇒ θ ≥ pi − Kso − sc .
Because these users purchase the other original whether they purchase
good i or copy it, we call them buyers. The maximum price they are
willing to pay for original i is equal to
pbi (θ ) = θ (so − sc) + K .
That is, they are willing to pay up to the extra value that an original
brings on top of a copy, augmented by the cost of the copying technology
(which they save once they decide to buy i instead of copying it).
Second, for intermediate valuation users such that pj − K ≤ θ (so −
sc) ≤ pj, expression (1) rewrites as
θso − pi + θso − p j ≥ 2θsc − K ⇐⇒ θ ≥ pi + p j − K2(so − sc) .
For these users, the best use of one good depends on the best use of the
other good: if they purchase good i, they also purchase good j; if they
copy good i, they also copy good j. We therefore call them switchers. How
much are switchers willing to pay for good i? Going from two copies to
two originals, they earn twice the extra value of an original compared
to a copy, and they trade the cost of the copying technology for the price
of the other original. So, their maximum price is given by
psi (θ , p j ) = 2θ (so − sc) + K − p j .
Finally, for low-valuation users such that θ (so − sc) ≤ pj − K, ex-
pression (1) rewrites as
θso − pi + θsc − K ≥ 2θsc − K ⇐⇒ θ ≥ piso − sc .
Because these users copy good j no matter what they decide about good
i, we call them copiers. What they are willing to pay for good i is just
the extra value of an original compared to a copy (for they have already
sunk the cost of the copying technology). Their maximum price is thus
equal to
pci (θ ) = θ (so − sc).
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FIGURE 1. PRICES AS A FUNCTION OF θ
The three price functions are depicted in Figure 1. We observe that
depending on the price of good j, the price function for good i can have
up to two kinks. The price function is (increasing and) concave in θ in the
neighborhood of pj/(so − sc) (which separates switchers from buyers),
and (increasing and) convex in θ in the neighborhood of (pj − K)/(so − sc)
(which separates copiers from switchers).
As a result, the demand function for good i has three segments and
two kinks,
Di (pi , p j ) = 1
θ¯ − θ
¯
×


(
θ¯ − pi − K
s
)
if p j + K ≤ pi (buyers)(
θ¯ − pi + p j − K
2s
)
if p j − K ≤ pi < p j
+ K (switchers)(
θ¯ − pi
s
)
if pi < p j − K (copiers)
(2)
where, to ease the exposition, we denote by s the quality difference
between originals and copies,
s ≡ so − sc .
Two remarks are in order. First, as long as K > 0, there exists a
range of prices for which goods are complements. Indeed, for pj − K ≤
pi < pj + K, an increase in the price of one good decreases the demand
for the other. When pj is close to pi, the marginal users choose to copy
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according to the value of the bundle, pi + pj. For other prices, the goods
remain independent: when pj is relatively smaller than pi, the marginal
users are buyers; when pj is relatively larger than pi, the marginal users
are copiers.
Second, as long as K > 0, the demand function has the same
concave and convex kinks as the price function depicted above. These
kinks result from the fact that the marginal consumer alters his or her
behavior about copying at some pivot prices pi. Similar kinks would
appear for other distributions of consumers’ types θ than the uniform
distribution assumed here.
The case of price competition over perfect complements is well
known since Cournot (1838). Yet, the present model differs from
Cournot’s case as complementarity only takes place over a limited
range of prices. A similar property appears in Gabszewicz et al. (2001)
who consider imperfect complements (i.e., the joint consumption of two
products provides an extra utility but products can still be consumed
individually). In our setting, however, complementarity is not built in
consumers’ preferences but stems, indirectly, from the existence of a
common substitute.
We now analyze the pricing decisions in the monopoly and
duopoly cases. To make this analysis relevant we assume that in any
possible demand regime, decision makers never find it optimal to cover
the whole market. Under the present demand system, this means that
high valuation consumers are willing to pay significantly more for the
goods than low valuation consumers. A sufficient condition is given by
the following assumption:13
A2: θ¯s > θ
¯
(s + so).
3. Multiproduct Monopoly
Since Cournot (1838), the analysis of a multiproduct monopoly selling
perfect complements is well known: the firm sets a unique price reflect-
ing only the value of the bundle. Yet, in the present paper, the case of
multiproduct monopoly deserves some attention. Indeed, as goods are
complement only over a limited range of prices, it is not sure whether
the firm’s optimal prices will lie in that range. Indeed, when prices are
close, the firm faces only switchers. By contrast, when prices differ by
more than the fixed cost K, the firm faces two groups of consumers:
copiers and buyers. The firm may follow two strategies. On the one
13. Together, Assumptions A1 and A2 give a fair representation of the reality as they
guarantee that there are always some consumers who pirate at least one good.
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hand it may set close prices and target the demand by switchers. On
the other hand, the firm may set a high price and target the buyers in
one market, while it sets a low price and targets the copiers in the other
market, the prices being sufficiently distant to avoid some consumers
to become switchers. Doing so, the firm is able to collect high revenues
on the buyers who have a high willingness to pay. It nevertheless turns
out that the latter strategy is not optimal.
Formally, the monopoly chooses prices p1 and p2 so as to maximize
profits,
max
p1, p2
πm = p1 D1(p1, p2) + p2 D2(p1, p2),
where demands are given by (2) and where the firm is assumed to have
zero production cost.
Proposition 1: The multiproduct monopolist sets any price (p1, p2) such
that (p1 + p2)/2 = pm ≡ θ¯s/2 + K/4 and p2 − K < p1 ≤ p2.
Proof . See the Appendix.
We prove in the Appendix that the strategy where the monopolist
targets buyers and copiers on separate markets is dominated because
the optimal prices on each market are not distant enough (i.e., they do
not satisfy |pi − p j | > K ).14 As a result, the monopolist sells the two
goods at prices such that marginal buyers are switchers. The difference
between the two prices is limited upward to avoid that marginal users
become copiers or buyers.
It is important to note that prices are neither unique nor symmetric.
The monopolist might well set different prices for the two goods
although consumers value these goods exactly in the same way. It is
because the copying technology offers a common substitute for the
goods and because the monopolist prefers to target switchers that only
the sum of the two prices matters for the consumers, as well as for the
monopolist. Our setting slightly contrasts Cournot’s (1838) discussion
about perfect complements because products are here not genuine
complements. Henceforth, the monopolist is constrained to set its prices
in some price range. For instance, the firm has no possibility of setting
a zero price for one good and collecting its revenue on the other as it
would be possible for perfect complements. Consumers are likely to
take the free good and copy the other good.
Several additional comments are in order. First, Assumption A1
implies that the monopolist sets an average price pm that is smaller than
14. It is possible to show that this result holds for alternative specifications of the
preferences for the two goods provided that types are sufficiently correlated.
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the price it would set for each good if there were no threat of piracy. To
compute the latter price, note that a user θ ∈ [θ
¯
, θ¯ ] who purchases the
original good i gets a utility of θso − pi. If copying is not an option, the
demand for this good is simply equal to Di (pi ) = (θ¯ − pi/so)/(θ¯ − θ¯ ).The optimal price for the monopolist is easily found as pM = θ¯so/2.
Simple computations establish that pM > pm ⇐⇒ θ¯sc > K/2, which
is clearly implied by Assumption A1. It follows that the presence of
piracy also reduces profits. Second, it is easily seen that pm decreases as
copies become a closer substitute for originals (i.e., if K decreases and/or sc
increases). Finally, in the extreme case where K = 0, the demands for the
two goods are independent and the monopolists sets the same price for
both: p1 = p2 = θ¯s/2.
We now examine the case of the duopoly.
4. Duopoly
Under a duopoly, each information good i ∈ {1, 2} is produced and
sold by a separate firm. In the limiting case where K = 0, demands are
independent and the producers act as local monopolists; they set the
same prices as the multiproduct monopolist would do in this situation:
p1 = p2 = θ¯s/2. However, for K > 0, the interdependence between the
demand functions is a source of strategic interaction. To analyze this
interaction, we proceed in two steps: first, we derive firm i ’s best reponse
and then we compute the Bertrand–Nash price equilibria.
4.1 Best Response Function
Best-response functions are derived from the demand functions (2). Be-
cause the demand functions are piece-wise linear and include a convex
kink, firms’ best-response functions are expected to be discontinuous.
In fact, the point of discontinuity will take place when marginal users
shift from being switchers to copiers. We now characterize the portion
of the best response of firm i below and above the discontinuity.
Targeting buyers or switchers? The optimal price on the buyers of good
i is equal to
pb∗i ≡ arg maxpi pi
(
θ¯ − pi − K
s
)
= 1
2
(θ¯s + K ).
Firm i’s best response is to set pi = pb∗i as long as the competitor’s
price does not to entice the marginal consumer to become a switcher.
Using (2), this is so as long as
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p j ≤ pb∗i − K ⇐⇒ p j ≤ p f ≡
1
2
(θ¯s − K ).
Note that pf > 0 under Assumptions A1 and A2.
For pj > pf , some low-valuation users are enticed to switch to
copying. Firm i can either accommodate these switching users by
lowering its price, or it can avoid them and concentrate on higher-
valuation users by increasing its price. On the one hand, when pj is
low enough, firm i sets a “limit price” to “deter” switchers. By (2), it sets
a price equal to
pDi (p j ) = p j + K
(or just a small amount below this price) and achieves a corresponding
profit of πDi (pj). This price is an increasing function of pj. Because more
users tend to switch to the copying technology when the competitor
raises its price pj, firm i must raise its price pi to avoid the switchers.
Hence, there exists a range of prices such that prices are strategic
complements.
When pj gets larger, firm i has no other choice but to accommodate
switchers. It sets a price equal to ps∗i (pj) where
ps∗i (p j ) ≡ arg maxpi pi
(
θ¯ − pi + p j − K
2s
)
= θ¯s + K − p j
2
,
and achieves a corresponding profit of π s∗i (pj). The price p
s∗
i (pj) is a
decreasing function of the competitor’s price; prices are then strategic
substitutes in this range of prices.
The transition between deterrence and accommodation of switch-
ers takes place at the price pd such that deterence and accommodation of
switchers yield the same profit and thus the same price: pDi (p
d) = ps∗i (pd),
or equivalently
pd = 1
3
(2θ¯s − K ) > p f .
Targeting copiers? Because of the convex kink in the demand function,
the shift from switchers to copiers has to be analyzed by comparing
profit levels. The optimal price and profit on copiers are equal to
pc∗i ≡ arg maxpi pi
(
θ¯ − pi
s
)
= 1
2
θ¯s and π c∗i =
1
4
θ¯2s.
We readily get that
π s∗i (p j ) > π
c∗
i ⇐⇒ p j < pe ≡ (2 −
√
2)θ¯s + K .
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The regime including accommodation of switchers is part of the
best-response function as long as
pd < pe ⇐⇒ K > 3
√
2 − 4
4
θ¯s. (3)
In this case there exists a downard jump at pj = pe.
Otherwise, accommodation of switchers is not part of the best-
response function and the latter has a downward jump from deterrence
of switchers to accommodation of copiers for another price pj = pe′,
where πDi (p
e′) = π c∗i , which is equivalent to
pe′ = 1
2
(θ¯s − K ) + 1
2
√
K (2θ¯s + K ).
Summarizing our results, we have under condition (3), the best-
response function is given by
p∗i (p j ) =


pb∗i if p j ≤ p f ,
pDi (p j ) if p
f ≤ p j ≤ pd ,
ps∗i (p j ) if p
d ≤ p j ≤ pe ,
pc∗i if p j > p
e .
Otherwise it is given by
p∗i (p j ) =


pb∗i if p j ≤ p f ,
pDi (p j ) if p
f ≤ p j ≤ pe′,
pc∗i if p j > p
e′.
Figure 2 displays these functions (in black for firms 1 and in gray for
firm 2) for ‘high’ and ‘low’ fixed cost of copying (resp. in the left- and
right-hand panel).
4.2 Existence of Equilibria in Pure Strategies
Because of discontinuities in the best-response functions, equilibria in
pure strategies might fail to exist. Intuitively, the possible inexistence
of equilibria stems from firms’ free-riding behavior with respect to the
threat of copying. If both firms take this threat seriously and quote low
prices to accommodate copiers, then there exists an opportunity for
either firm to raise its price while keeping a sufficiently large demand
and making a larger profit. This situation is shown in the right-hand
panel of Figure 2 where best-response functions do no intersect. By
contrast, the left-hand panel shows the situation where firms reach
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an equilibrium as their best-response function intersect at a symmetric
equilibrium. More formally, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in
which both firms focus on switchers and set the price pS ≡ 13 (2θ¯s + K ) if
and only if
K > Kˆ ≡ 3
√
2 − 4
2
θ¯s. (4)
Otherwise, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof . See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 tells us that the only possible Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies is symmetric and is such that both firms target switchers.
This result could not have been guessed at the outset. Moreover, we
also see that the market fails to reach an equilibrium for small fixed
costs of copying because the price pS and the profit associated to this
strategy decrease with K. For a low enough value of K, profits under
accommodation of copiers become more attractive and firms tend to
cut their price to pc∗i . As a result, the absence of duopoly equilibria
for low fixed costs of the copying technology casts some doubts on
the traditional analyses of the threat of copying in one-good monopoly
settings.
4.3 Pure-Strategy Equilibrium: Cournot Effect
We first focus on the situation in which the market reaches a symmetric
equilibrium. One observes that
pS = 13(2θ¯s + K ) > pm =
1
4
(2θ¯s + K ).
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Corollary 1: The price set by duopolists at the pure-strategy equilibrium
is higher than the average price set by the multiproduct monopolist.
At the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, the duopolists
focus on switchers. In such a case, the copying technology constitutes a
common substitute for their original good. The presence of this common
substitute turns goods i and j (which are a priori perfectly horizontally
differentiated) into complementary goods. As a result, the so-called
Cournot effect (Cournot, 1838) applies. That is, the multiproduct mo-
nopolist has an incentive to decrease prices further than the duopolists
do because it realizes that decreasing the price for one good increases
demand for the other good by making copying less attractive.
The externality that each firm imposes on the other can be quite im-
portant. Indeed, if the quality of copies is sufficiently low, the duopolists
end up setting prices higher than the price they would set under no threat
of copying.15 As we noted above, in the absence of piracy, the demands
for the two goods are independent. Hence, the duopolists set the same
price as a monopolist, that is, pM = 12 θ¯so . We observe that the price
set by duopolists at the pure-strategy equilibrium (pS) is higher than
the monopoly price under no threat of copying (pM) if and only if
K ≥ 12 θ¯ (4sc − so), which is clearly satisfied if sc < so/4.
The last two findings qualify the argument that the threat of piracy
forces firms to lower their prices and that the usage of the copyrighted
product increases with piracy. Instead, our model gives some evidence to
the common claim of copyright holders, who assert that piracy reduces
their sales. These results also cast some doubt on the social benefits
of stronger competition in information good markets that are subject
to potential piracy. The last two findings indeed suggest that a more
concentrated industry is better equipped to provide surplus both to
legal consumers and to producers. We consider the latter issue in more
detail in Section 5.
4.4 Mixed-Strategy Equilibria: Price Dispersion
When K < Kˆ , there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. Neverthe-
less, by Glicksberg (1952), there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilib-
rium because profits are continuous. Therefore, firms randomize prices
15. The possibility of the duopolists raising prices above the monopoly price has also
been noted in the context of the pharmaceutical industry (we thank a coeditor for bringing
this issue to our attention). As argued by Frank and Salkever (1997), when a patent expires,
the former patent holder may raise price to serve the high end of the market and leave it
to the firms producing generic drugs to sell to the low end of the market. This is for pure
market segmentation reasons. In the present model, the price-raising effect stems from a
coordination failure between the duopolists to deter piracy.
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at equilibrium when the cost of the copying technology is low enough.
As a result, price dispersion can be observed. In this section, we first
characterize a simple and intuitive class of mixed-strategy equilibria; we
then discuss the impact of the copying technology on price dispersion.
As in Boccard and Wauthy (1997, 2003), the piecewise linearity of
the demand function allows us to show that firms do not use continuous
densities. This allows us to focus on mixed-strategy equilibria in which
firms play two prices with the same probability distributions. The
following proposition shows that such equilibria exist provided that
fixed costs are not too small.
Proposition 3: When Kˆ > K > K˜ ≡ 0.0274θ¯s, there exists an equilib-
rium where firms randomize between the prices
pa = 2θ¯s + xK4 − x and pb =
2θ¯s + (x + 1)K
x + 3 > pa
with probabilities x and 1 − x. The probability x is equal to zero when K is
equal to Kˆ , it increases when K decreases below Kˆ and it is equal to x = 0.3603
when K tends to K˜ . Prices are such that pb > pa + K.
Proof . See the Appendix.
Unfortunately, the probability x has no explicit expression. Nu-
merical simulations show that for any admissible set of parameters,
the probability x monotonically increases when K falls from Kˆ to K˜ .
When K < K˜ , symmetric mixed strategies with two prices are not
equilibria; firms have to randomize over a larger number of prices. The
characterization of such equilibria goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Because pb > pa + K, the mixed-strategy equilibrium yields ex post
realizations that include the three regimes with a positive probability.
Each firm faces switchers when its price realization is equal to the other
firm’s realization; when price realizations are different, a firm faces
buyers when it quotes the highest price and copiers when it quotes
the lowest price. Hence, by playing mixed strategies, firms are able to
avoid the negative Cournot effect of competing on a segment of demand
where goods are perfect complements. Indeed, with probability x(1 −
x), they set the prices (pb, pa) and the firm setting pb collects revenues on
high-valuation consumers (i.e., the “buyers”).
One can check that prices can be ranked as in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2: (1) Prices are ranked as follows: pc∗i < pa < pa + K < pb <
pS . (2) The expected price is higher than the average monopoly price: xpa +
(1 − x)pb > pm.
368 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
K 
0.5 1.0 
1.6 
2.0 
pS 
pb 
pa 
pm 
xpa +(1-x)pb 
^ K 
/\/ 
K 
2.4 
FIGURE 3. PRICES AS A FUNCTION OF K
Figure 3 illustrates these results. The intuition behind part (1) goes
as follows: firm i has no incentive to set prices below pc∗i because, if it
does, it gets a positive marginal revenue irrespective of firm j’s mixed
strategy; similarly, it gets a negative marginal revenue whenever it sets
a price above pS. This result demonstrates that the Cournot effect is less
acute than in the pure-strategy equilibrium. However, part (2) shows
that the Cournot effect does not disappear completely: the expected
price at the mixed-strategy equilibrium is still higher than the average
price set by a multiproduct monopolist. In other words, firms would
like to coordinate on a limit-price to eliminate piracy but are unable to
commit to do so as they prefer to free-ride on the rival’s effort. Therefore,
they choose random prices as a way to share the burden of deterring
piracy. Yet, this joint effort remains insufficient.
The absence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in prices is often
presented as an explanation for equilibrium price dispersion. In consumer
search models (see, e.g., Varian, 1980; Baye and Morgan, 2001), equilib-
rium price dispersion arises because firms are tempted to lower price to
attract informed consumers, but realize that if they do so, they forego
rents from uninformed consumers; therefore, each firm intentionally
randomizes prices to reduce the ability of rival firms to undercut its
own price.
Our model generates similar price dispersion results and shares a
similar intuition. Yet, it does not rely on search frictions and information
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asymmetries because our consumers are perfectly informed about prices
and, therefore, do not need to search. Here, firms also face the tension
between lowering price to attract low-valuation users (the copiers) and
increasing price to extract rents from high-valuation consumers (the
buyers). The difference with search models is that, in our setting, the
existence of various classes of consumers results, endogenously, from
the presence of the copying technology. In fact, price dispersion is even
a prerequisite for two of these classes to exist at equilibrium; indeed, all
consumers are switchers when prices do not differ by more than K.
A number of empirical studies document significant and persistent
price dispersion on markets for information goods.16 The previous
argument relates such price dispersion to piracy. It is interesting to study
the impact of the copying technology on price dispersion. On the one
hand, supposing that firms quote two prices, it can readily be shown
that the price dispersion pb − pa decreases when K falls. On the other
hand, when firms quote more than two prices, we can also show that
the range [pc∗i , pS], within which price atoms must lie, also shrinks as K
decreases. Hence, the model predicts that price dispersion is likely to be
lower for information goods that are more exposed to piracy.17
5. Welfare Analysis
As indicated in Section 1, the economics of IP protection discusses
the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations:
to remedy the long-run underproduction problem that might arise
from insufficient incentives to create, the law grants exclusive rights
to creators, which entail a short-run underutilization problem.
Our simple framework allows us to shed some new light on this
policy debate. First, in a short-run perspective, we can perform compar-
ative statics exercises to assess the effects of stronger IP protection; we
can also compare the welfare performances of two market structures,
namely a multiproduct monopoly versus a duopoly. Second, in a long-
run perspective, we can measure incentives to create and compare again
the relative merits of monopoly and duopoly. As we now explain,
policy implications are not clear cut. Indeed, from a static perspective,
the multiproduct monopoly enhances welfare with respect to the duopoly, but
from a dynamic perspective, the duopoly provides higher incentives to create
than the monopoly.
16. See, for example, Bailey (1998), Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), and Iyer and Pazgal
(2003).
17. Recall, nevertheless, that no dispersion is observed for K > Kˆ (as a unique pure-
strategy equilibrium exists).
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5.1 Ex Post Efficiency Considerations
In many discussions, the protection of IP rights calls for an increase in
the cost of piracy (Novos and Waldman, 1984; Yoon, 2002, etc). In this
model, this would call for two policy measures: first, one can increase
the fixed cost of the copying technology K by, for example, applying a tax
on the reproduction devices; second, one can take actions to decrease
the value of a copy sc. Therefore, we assess the effects of a change in
K and in sc for the multiproduct monopoly and for the duopoly. As
for the duopoly, we restrict for now our attention to the case where K
is sufficently large so that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We
consider the mixed-strategy equilibrium case below using numerical
simulations.
When a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the duopoly, we can
easily analyze the effects of a marginal strengthening of IP rights. Let
θS ≡ (4θ¯s − K )/(6s) be the type of the switching user at the equilibrium
prices pS. This is the lowest type among the consumers who purchase an
original good. Users with type θ ∈ [θS, θ¯ ] purchase an original whereas,
by Assumption A1, users with type θ ∈ [θ
¯
, θS) make use of copies (we
call them “pirates”). Similarly, in the multiproduct monopoly, let θm ≡
(2pm − K )/(2s) = (2θ¯s − K )/(4s) denote the marginal user at price pm.
We do not need to perform separate comparative statics analyses
for the monopoly and for the duopoly as the equilibrium price and
demand vary in the same direction in the two cases. We observe that the
two policy measures have different effects. On the one hand, a rise in the
copying cost (dK > 0) implies an upward parallel shift of the demand for
original goods. It then increases equilibrium prices (dpS, dpm > 0) and
increases the set of consumers buying original goods (dθS, dθm < 0). The
number of pirates falls. On the other hand, a deterioration of the value
of copies (dsc < 0) implies a rotation of the demand, thereby reducing
its elasticity. The deterioration of the value of copies then leads to an
increase in price (dpS, dpm > 0) and to a reduction of the set of consumers
buying original goods (dθS, dθm > 0). The number of pirates increases.
In the Appendix, we formally establish the following results,
which generalize those obtained by Bae and Choi (2006) for a single-
product monopoly.18 First, the two ways of strengthening IP protection
increase (optimal or equilibrium) profits. This result is trivial for an increase
in K as both the price and the quantity demanded increase. As for a
decrease in sc, price and quantity move in opposite directions, meaning
that the result is a priori ambiguous. However, under Assumptions A1
18. What Bae and Choi (2006) call the “copying regime” corresponds to the regime
faced by our multiproduct monopolist and by our duopolists around the symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium.
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and A2, it can be shown that the positive effect on price outweighs the
negative effect on demand.
Second, the two ways of strengthening IP protection decrease consumer
surplus. To see this, we observe that both categories of users suffer from
a stronger protection: first and obviously, pirates are negatively affected
by the decrease in the attractiveness of copies (either through a larger
cost or through a lower quality); second, buyers of originals are charged
a higher price (as dK > 0 and dsc < 0 both imply dpS > 0 and dpm > 0).
Finally, we evaluate the effect on social surplus by adding the
two previous effects. The change in social surplus writes as dW =
−(θk − θ¯ ) dK − (θk − θ¯ )
2 dsc − 2pk dθk (with k = m for the monopoly case
and k = S for the duopoly case). The overall effect is negative if the
additional costs imposed on all pirates is lower than the additional
revenue from having an additional legal consumer. This is so when
the policy measure consists of deteriorating the copies. For dsc < 0 and
dK = 0, dW = −(θk − θ¯ )
2dsc − 2pk dθk < 0: strenghtening IP protection by
making copies less valuable decreases social surplus. On the other hand, the
policy measure may consist of an increase in the fixed cost of copying
(dK > 0, dsc = 0). There are two possible cases. First, the copy technology
is taxed and the proceeds of the tax are efficiently redistributed to
the consumers through lump sum transfers, so that the increase of K
has no direct impact on welfare. In that case, dW = −2pk dθk > 0 as θ k
decreases after the increase of K: strenghtening IP protection by taxing the
copying technology (and redistributing the tax proceeds) increases social sur-
plus. Second, if the tax proceeds are not (or inefficiently) redistributed,
then dW = −(θk − θ¯ ) dK − 2pk dθk and the sign of the welfare change isambiguous. We show in the Appendix that strenghtening IP protection
by making copies more costly decreases social surplus if K is not too large; it
increases social surplus otherwise.
To close our static welfare analysis, we repeat the conclusion we
drew in the previous section: the multiproduct monopolist always sets
lower prices than duopolists do; as the monopolist also achieves higher
profits, social surplus is undoubtedly higher under a multiproduct monopoly
than under a duopoly.
Finally, we provide results from numerical simulations pointing
that some of the previous results might not hold in the region of
parameters where symmetric mixed strategies with two prices exist.
For the sake of the exposition, we concentrate on the impact of K.
Figure 4 depicts an example that shows one noticeable difference with
the symmetric equilibrium regime: as K increases, expected duopoly
profits (Eπ ) decrease in some range. The explanation is the following: as K
increases, the prices pa and pb move in opposite directions and therefore,
although the expected price increases, expected profits decrease.
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5.2 Ex Ante Efficiency Considerations
Comparing our framework with an economy where only a single
information good is available allows us to measure the (gross) incentive
to create a new information good. In the previous model, if only one
information good is available instead of two, it is easy to see that under
Assumption A1, the producer of this good only faces “buyers.” The
demand function is thus given by Di (pi ) = (θ¯ − (pi − K )/s)/(θ¯ − θ¯ ),and the optimal price and profit are given by pb∗i = (θ¯s + K )/2 and
π b∗i = (θ¯s + K )2/(4s).
There are two cases to consider when going from one to two goods.
A first possibility is that the new good is created by an incumbent firm
that already produces the extant good; the ex post economy is then
organized as a multiproduct monopoly. From Proposition 1, we know
that the multiproduct monopolist’s optimal (average) price and profit
are given by pm = (2θ¯s + K )/4 and πm = (2θ¯s + K )2/(8s). One readily
observes that, under Assumptions A1 and A2, we have that πm > π b∗i ,
meaning that an incumbent firm has a gross incentive to introduce
a second good. Still, although goods are genuinely independent, the
profit per good decreases when the number of goods rises: πm < 2π b∗i .
Indeed, the monopolist jeopardizes the sales of the first good when it introduces
the second good. Copying becomes more attractive when the number of
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goods is larger and the firm is compelled to reduce the average price of
originals.
Alternatively, the new good could be created by an entrant firm,
turning the ex post economy into a duopoly. Supposing for now that the
condition of Proposition 2 is met, prices and profits at the pure-strategy
equilibrium are given by pS ≡ (2θ¯s + K )/3 and πS = (2θ¯s + K )2/(18s).
Let us now compare the two scenarios. Comparing prices, it
is easily checked that Assumptions A1 and A2 imply the following
ranking: pm < pb∗i < pS. Therefore, the average price decreases when the new
good is introduced by an incumbent firm, whereas it increases when the new
good is introduced by an entrant. This is another illustration of the negative
externality that independent producers impose on each other, and on
consumers, in the presence of copying.
Next, comparing profits, we can gauge the (gross) incentive to
create in the two settings. We say that an entrant has higher incentives
to introduce a second good than an incumbent if the following condition
is met: πS > πm − π b∗i . Under no threat of piracy, goods are independent
and incentives for the incumbent and the entrant are exactly equal.
However, under piracy, the question is whether the free-riding problem
between duopolists harms the entrant to a greater or to a lesser extent
than the cannibalization effect hurts the incumbent. In the Appendix,
we show that when a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the duopoly game,
the duopoly always yields larger incentives to create than the multiproduct
monopoly. Formally, we show that K > Kˆ implies that πS > πm − π b∗i :
the cannibalization effect is stronger than the free-riding effect.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the previous conclusion may still apply
in the region of parameters where symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
with two prices exist.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we qualify the traditional results and insights about the
impact of piracy obtained in a one-good monopoly setting. When there
exist more than one information good, increasing returns to scale in the
copying technology create an interdependence between the demands
for information goods, which would be independent otherwise. We
first show that a multiproduct monopoly may set different prices for
its goods. We then show that two-product duopolies are subject to free-
riding behaviors with respect to the threat of piracy. If the two firms
take this threat seriously by quoting low prices, then there exists an
opportunity for a firm to take advantage of this situation and to raise its
price. This can lead to the absence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
if the fixed cost of copying is low enough. In this case, firms may
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randomize between several prices. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first contribution showing that price dispersion in the information
good industries can be generated by the presence of piracy. When the
fixed cost of copying is not too small, the market can yield a symmetric
equilibrium with prices that are larger than the (average) price of the
multiproduct monopoly. Furthermore, those prices can even become
larger than the price of a monopoly that faces no threat of piracy.
The externality that firms impose on each other can therefore be quite
important and it can drastically reduce the demand for legal copies.
In sum, the interactions between producers of information goods
under the threat of piracy dramatically alter the equilibrium out-
come compared to the outcome obtained under a one-good monopoly
setting. Taking those interactions into account also yields surpris-
ing welfare implications: concentration appears as welfare-enhancing
from a static perspective but welfare-detrimental from a dynamic
perspective.
The present model suggests several avenues of future research.
First, the current study is limited to the production of two perfectly
differentiated information goods. It would be worthwhile to explore
the pricing decisions and welfare aspects under piracy threat in a
setting with more numerous and less differentiated varieties. Second, by
assuming exogenous production and pricing of the copying technology,
the current model sets aside the strategic issue of integration between
the creators (or distributors) of information goods and the sellers of
copying devices. It seems natural to investigate about the competition
and welfare implications of such integration processes.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose w.l.o.g. that p1 ≤ p2. Then, the monopolist gets the following
profits according to whether its two prices significantly differ or not:19
either max
p1, p2
π
(1)
m = (p1 + p2)
(
θ¯ − p1 + p2 − K
2s
)
s.t. p1 ≥ p2 − K,
or max
p1, p2
π (2)m = p1
(
θ¯ − p1
s
)
+ p2
(
θ¯ − p2 − K
s
)
s.t. p1 ≤ p2 − K .
19. Profits are actually multiplied by the constant (θ¯ − θ
¯
), which we forget from now
on as it does not affect optimal decisions.
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The first problem is equivalent to
max
p
πm = 2p
(
θ¯ − 2p − K
2s
)
where p ≡ (p1 + p2)/2. Optimal price and profit are easily found as
pm = θ¯2 s +
K
4
and π (1)∗m =
(2θ¯s + K )2
8s
.
This problem includes an infinity of prices (p1, p2) such that (p1 + p2)/2 =
pm subject to the contraint set in this first problem: p1 ≥ p2 − K.
The unconstrained solution to the second problem is p1 = θ¯s/2
and p2 = θ¯s/2 + K/2. This solution does not meet the constraint because
p1 > p2 − K. To find the corner solution, we set p1 = p2 − K and rewrite
the problem as
max
p2
π (2)m = (p2 − K )
(
θ¯ − p2 − K
s
)
+ p2
(
θ¯ − p2 − K
s
)
.
The solution is found as p2 = (2θ¯s + 3K )/4, which yields p1 = (2θ¯s −
K )/4 and
π (2)∗m =
(2θ¯s + K )2
8s
= π (1)∗m .
As p1 = p2 − K, we have that the corner solution to the second problem
belongs to the set of combinations (p1, p2) that solve the first problem,
which completes the proof. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that the optimal prices pb∗i , p
s∗
i (pj), and p
c∗
i are interior
solutions and do not lead to full-market coverage under Assumptions
A1 and A2. Indeed, the price pb∗i is an interior solution iff p
b∗
i >
pbi (θ¯
) ⇐⇒ K < (θ¯ − 2θ
¯
)s, which is true under A1 and A2. The price
ps∗i (pj) with pj ≥ 0 is an interior solution iff psi (θ¯ , p j ) < p
s∗
i (p j ) ⇐⇒
K < p j + 2(θ¯ − 2θ¯ )(so − sc), which is less stringent than the previouscondition. Finally, the price pc∗i is an interior solution iff pc∗i > pci (θ¯ ) ⇐⇒
θ¯ − 2θ
¯
> 0, which follows from A2.
Each best-response function p∗i (·) and p∗j (·) can have four segments.
Removing symmetric configurations, we need to check the existence of
a pure strategy equilibria for the 10 following configurations. For some
configurations we will need to distinguish equilibrium conditions in
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which the switchers’ branch ps∗j (·) exists (i.e., pd ≤ pe or condition (3)) or
in which it does not (i.e., pd > pe or the reverse of condition (3)).
1. The configuration (pb∗i , p
b∗
j ) cannot be an equilibrium because p
b∗
j >
pf and thus the best response of i cannot be equal to pb∗i : p
∗
i (p
b∗
j ) = pb∗i .
2. The configuration (pDi (·), pDj (·)) cannot be an equilibrium because the
system pi = pDi (pj) and pj = pDj (pi) has no solution.
3. The configuration (ps∗i (·), ps∗j (·)) is an equilibrium if and only if
K > Kˆ ≡ 3
√
2 − 4
2 θ¯s. Indeed, solving the system pi = ps∗i (pj) and pj =
ps∗j (pi), we find pi = p j = pS ≡ 13 (2θ¯s + K ). It is a best response for
both firms to set pi = ps∗i (pj) if and only if pd ≤ pS ≤ pe. The first
inequality is clearly met, whereas the second is met provided that
pS < pe ⇐⇒ K > 3
√
2 − 4
2 θ¯s. This last condition is compatible with
pd ≤ pe .
4. The configuration (pc∗i , p
c∗
j ) cannot be an equilibrium because one
can check that pc∗j < p
e and pc∗j < p
e′. Hence, p∗i (p
c∗
j ) = pc∗i .
5. The configuration (pb∗i , p
D
j (·)) cannot be an equilibrium because
pDj (p
b∗
i ) = pb∗i + K > pf and thus p∗i [pDj (pb∗i )] = pb∗i .
6. Similarly, the configuration (pb∗i , p
s∗
j (·)) cannot be an equilibrium
because ps∗j (p
b∗
i ) = 34 θ¯s + K4 > p f , and hence p∗i [ps∗j (pb∗i )] = pb∗i .
7. The configuration (pb∗i , p
c∗
j ) cannot be an equilibrium because
when pd ≤ pe, one can easily check that pb∗i < pe so that p∗j (pb∗i ) =
pc∗j . Also, when p
d > pe, we get pb∗i < p
e′ iff K < 23 θ¯s which fol-
lows from Assumptions A1 and A2. Therefore, p∗j (p
b∗
i ) = pc∗j when
pe < pd.
8. The configuration (pDi (·), ps∗j (·)) cannot be an equilibrium because
solving for pi = pDi (pj) and pj = ps∗j (pi), we get p j = p˜ j ≡ 23 θ¯s > pd ,
meaning that p∗i ( p˜ j ) = pDi ( p˜ j ).
9. The configuration (pDi (·), pc∗j ) cannot be an equilibrium because
when pd ≤ pe, we have pDi (pc∗j ) = pc∗j + K = 12 θ¯s + K < pe . When
pd > pe, we have pDi (p
c∗
j ) = 12 θ¯s + K < pe′ iff K < 14 θ¯s, which is
always true. Therefore, p∗j [p
D
i (p
c∗
j )] = pc∗j .
10. The configuration (pc∗i , p
s∗
j (·)) cannot be an equilibrium because, for
this to be an equilibrium, we should have (1) ps∗j (p
c∗
i ) = 34 θ¯s + K2 ≥
pe ⇐⇒ K ≤ 0.328θ¯s, and (2) pc∗i ≥ pd ⇐⇒ K ≥ 0.5θ¯s, which is
incompatible with (1). 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Firm i’s profit is equal to π (pi, pj) where
π (pi , p j )
=


π b(pi ) = pi
(
θ¯ − pi − K
s
)
if p j ∈ [0, pi − K )
π s(pi , p j ) = pi
(
θ¯ − pi + p j − K
2s
)
if p j ∈ [pi − K, pi + K ),
π c(pi ) = pi
(
θ¯ − pi
s
)
if p j ∈ [pi + K, ∞)
Each section of the profit function is concave in pi.
We consider mixed-strategy equilibria that include two price
atoms pai and pbi played by player i with probabilities xi and 1 − xi.
Firm i’s expected profit is equal to
i = xi xjπ (pai , pa j ) + xi (1 − xj )π (pai , pb j )
+ (1 − xi )xjπ (pbi , pa j ) + (1 − xi )(1 − xj )π (pbi , pb j ).
We look for a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. This exists if we
can find probabilities and prices such that (x, pa, pb) = (xi, pai, pbi), i =
1, 2 and
(xi , pai , pbi ) = arg max
(xi , pai , pbi )
i s.t. (xj , pa j , pb j ) = (x, pa , pb), i = 1, 2.
First, suppose that the symmetric equilibrium is such that pb ≤
pa + K. For (xi, pai, pbi), i ∈ {1, 2} close enough to (x, pa, pb), firm i’s payoff
is given by the function
i = xi xjπ s(pai , pa j ) + xi (1 − xj )π s(pai , pb j )
+ (1 − xi )xjπ s(pbi , pa j ) + (1 − xi )(1 − xj )π s(pbi , pb j ).
Because π s is strictly concave, it is easy to show that there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium with pS = pai = pbi, i ∈ {1, 2}. This is the equilib-
rium with pure strategies found in Proposition 2.
Second, suppose that the symmetric equilibrium is such that
pb > pa + K. For (xi, pai, pbi), i ∈ {1, 2} close enough to (x, pa, pb), firm i’s
expected payoff writes as
i = xi xjπ s(pai , pa j ) + xi (1 − xj )π c(pai )
+ (1 − xi )xjπ b(pbi ) + (1 − xi )(1 − xj )π s(pbi , pb j ).
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There are three first-order conditions for equilibrium,
∂i
∂pai
= 0 ⇐⇒ xi = 0 or xjπ spi (pai , pa j ) + (1 − xj )π cpi (pai ) = 0
∂i
∂pbi
= 0 ⇐⇒ xi = 1 or xjπ bpi (pbi ) + (1 − xj )π spi (pbi , pb j ) = 0
∂i
∂xi
= 0 ⇐⇒
{
xjπ s(pai , pa j ) + (1 − xj )π c(pai )
−xjπ b(pbi ) − (1 − xj )π s(pbi , pb j )
}
= 0, (A1)
where the subscript pi denotes a partial differentiation w.r.t. to pi. These
three conditions guarantee a maximum because ∂
21
∂p2a1
< 0, ∂
21
∂p2b1
< 0 and
the Hessian determinant is zero,
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2i
∂p2ai
0 0
0
∂2i
∂p2bi
0
0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 0.
We now determine the symmetric equilibrium by setting
(x, pa, pb) = (xi, pai, pbi), i = 1, 2 and xi = x ∈ (0, 1). We successively get
pa = 2θ¯s + xK4 − x , pb =
2θ¯s + (x + 1)K
x + 3
and
x = π
s(pb, pb) − π c(pa )
π s(pa , pa ) + π s(pb, pb) − π c(pa ) − π b(pb) .
One can check that pb > pa + K, which is consistent with the condition
pbi > pai + K, i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Equilibrium profits can be computed as the following functions of
x:
π c(pa ) = ((2 − x)θ¯s − xK ) (xK + 2θ¯s)(x − 4)2s ,
π s(pa , pa ) = 12(2(2 − x)θ¯s + (4 − 3x)K )
(xK + 2θ¯s)
(x − 4)2s ,
π s(pb, pb) = 12((x + 1)2θ¯s + (1 − x)K )
(2θ¯s + (x + 1)K )
(x + 3)2s ,
π b(pb) = (θ¯s(x + 1) + 2K ) (2θ¯s + (x + 1)K )(x + 3)2s .
After some substitutions, x solves
x =


(K 2 + 4θ¯sK )x4 + (20K 2 − 2θ¯sK + 8θ¯2s2)x3
+ (3K 2 + 38θ¯sK − 12θ¯2s2)x2 + (−8K 2 + 20θ¯2s2)x
+ 16K 2 − 8θ¯2s2 + 64θ¯sK


2K (x + 3)(4 − x)(x2 K + 2θ¯sx − θ¯s − 2K ) . (A2)
Hence x is the solution of a polynomial with degree 5. There is at least
one real solution. We have found no analytical solution.
Two cases can readily be studied. On the one hand, when K = Kˆ ≡
3
√
2 − 4
2 sθ¯ , expression (A2) implies that x = 0. Furthermore, one can check
that [ ∂
2i
∂xi ∂xj
]xj =0 < 0 and that [
∂2i
∂xi ∂K
]xj =0 < 0 so that [
∂xj
∂K ]xj =0 = [ ∂x∂K ]x=0 <
0. A smaller K increases the probability x above zero. Hence, mixed
strategy equilibria occur for K < Kˆ and pure strategy equilibria occur
otherwise. Furthermore, when x = 0 and K = Kˆ , we have that i =
π c∗i and that di/d K = ∂i/∂K + (dx/d K )(∂i/∂x) = (−10 +
√
2)θ¯ <
0. Therefore, expected profits under symmetric mixed strategy increase
above π c∗i as K decreases below Kˆ . For K smaller and close enough to
Kˆ , symmetric mixed strategy dominates the price strategy pc∗i .
On the other hand, when K → 0, we have that π s1(pa, pa) =
π s1(pb, pb) = π c1(pa) = π b1 (pb). So the right-hand side of expression (6) is
indefinite. To solve this problem, we approximate expression (6) by
dropping terms in K of order larger than one and we get
K (x4 − x3 − x2 + 3x + 8) + 1
2
θ¯s(2x − 1)(x2 − x + 2) = 0,
which yields the unique solution x = 1/2 when K → 0. Applying
this result, we get that the expected profits are equal to π c∗i − θ¯s/196.
Therefore, the symmetric strategy is dominated by the strategy pc∗i when
K → 0.
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The previous argument suggests that the two-price symmetric
mixed strategy is a maximum as long as the firms set prices such that
pai + K < pbi, but that it can be dominated by the one-price strategy pc∗i
for small enough K. To check when the symmetric mixed strategy is a
global maximum, we fix firm j’s strategy as (xj, paj, pbj) = (x, pa, pb) where
x > 0, and we verify whether firm i can profitably deviate by fixing any
other pair of prices. To this purpose, we sketch firm i’s expected profit
as a function of price pi,
i (pi ) = xπ (pi , pa ) + (1 − x)π (pi , pb).
Recall that π (pi, pa) and π (pi, pb) are combinations of three
quadratic and concave functions. Then, it is readily shown that i(pi) is a
piece-wise quadratic and concave function. Consider pi increasing from
zero. One can check that the first section of i(pi) is either increasing if
pc∗i ≥ pa − K, or bell-shaped with the maximum at pc∗i if pc∗i < pa − K; the
second section is bell-shaped with the maximum at pi = pa; the third sec-
tion is monotonically increasing; the fourth section is bell-shaped with
maximum at pi = pb, and the last section is monotonically decreasing.
If pc∗i ≥ pa − K, pi = pa, pb are the only candidates for a global maximum
and the above solution is the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with
two price atoms.
On the other hand, if pc∗i < pa − K, there are three candidates for a
global maximum: pi = pa, pb and pi = pc∗i . We need thus to check if pi = pc∗i
can yield a higher profit. If firm i plays pi = pa or pi = pb, it achieves an
expected profit equal to
∗i ≡ xπ s(pa , pa ) + (1 − x)π c(pa ) = (2 − x)
(2sθ¯ + K x)2
2s(4 − x)2 .
Otherwise, if firm i plays pi = pc∗i , it achieves a profit equal to π c∗i . Some
computations show that ∗i ≥ π c∗i is equivalent to
2x(2 − x)K 2 + 8θ¯s(2 − x)K − xs2θ¯2 ≥ 0.
Hence, K ≥ K1(x) ≡ θ¯s(2(4 − 2x) + (4 − x)
√
4 − 2x)/[2x(x − 2)]. Note
that the probability x depends on K. To get the probability x that
makes this inequality binding and that is simultaneously compatible
with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, we insert K1(x) in expression (5), we
evaluate at the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium to get
32 − 4(4 − x)√4 − 2x(1 + x2)
+ x(48 + x(−1 + x(−8 + x(−1 + 2x)))) = 0.
This equation has a unique solution in the interval x ∈ (0, 1), which is
equal to x˜ = 0.3603. The associated level of fixed cost of copying is equal
to K˜ ≡ 0.02739θ¯s < Kˆ .
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Hence, the above solution is not an equilibrium if K < K˜ and if
pc∗i < pa − K. The latter condition rewrites as
K <
x
4(2 − x) θ¯s.
Using equation (A2), this is equivalent to K < K˜ ′ ≡ 0.04233θ¯s, which is
implied by K < K˜ .
We conclude that the solution (xi, pai, pbi) = (x, pa, pb), i = 1, 2, is a
mixed-strategy equilibrium with two atoms provided that K > K˜ . 
A.4 Welfare Properties
As indicated in Section 5, we can apply the same analysis to the
multiproduct monopoly and to the duopoly with a symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium. We note pk and θ k, respectively, for the optimal or
equilibrium price and for the marginal user, with k = m, S.
Effects on profit. An increase in K induces variations in profits
through effects on price and demand. Changes in the surplus of the
two producers can be written as dPS = 2(θ¯ − θk) dpk − 2pk dθk . This
expression is clearly positive for dK > 0 as it implies dpk > 0 and
dθ k < 0. The sign for dsc < 0 is a priori ambiguous. It is readily verified
that dPS/dsc < 0 iff K < 2θ¯s, which follows from the combination of
Assumptions A1 and A2. Therefore, profits increase when copies are
damaged or made more expensive.
Effects on consumer surplus. The consumers’ surplus obtained from the
use of both information goods includes four effects: the negative effect on
illegal copiers because of the increase in the copying cost K; the negative
effect of the deterioration of copies on the copying users; the negative
effect of larger prices on legal consumers; and finally the effect on the
switching users who move from copying to purchasing an original. At
the price pk, the latter effect on marginal users is nil because they are
indifferent between copying and purchasing the orginals. Hence, dCS =
−(θk − θ¯ ) dK + (θk − θ¯ )
2 dsc − 2(θ¯ − θk) dpk + 0 ∗ dθk , which is negative
because all terms are nonpositive (dK > 0, dsc < 0, dpk > 0). Consumers
are negatively affected by both policy measures.
Effects on social surplus. The change in social surplus writes as dW =
dPS + dCS = −(θk − θ¯ ) dK − (θk − θ¯ )
2 dsc − 2pk dθk . This expression is
negative if the additional costs imposed on all copiers is smaller than the
additional revenue from having an additional legal consumer. This is the
case for dsc < 0. For dK > 0 (and assuming no or inefficient redistribution
of tax proceeds), the sign of the welfare change is ambiguous.
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 In the monopoly case, one can show that dW < 0 iff K < Km ≡ 23 s(θ¯ −
4θ
¯
). The following numerical example shows that both cases can occur
under our assumptions. Take so = 7, sc = 4, θ¯ = 500 and θ¯ = 100. Onechecks that these values satisfy Assumption A2. To meet Assumption
A1, we need K < θ
¯
sc = 400. We check that Km = 200 < θ¯sc . In the duopoly case, one can show that dW < 0 iff K < KS ≡
2
5 s(4θ¯ − 9θ¯ ). The following numerical example shows that both casescan occur under our assumptions. Take so = 4, sc = 1, θ¯ = 244 and
θ
¯
= 100. One checks that these values satisfy Assumption A2. To meet
the condition for a pure-strategy equilibrium and Assumption A1, we
need K ∈ (Kˆ , θ
¯
sc) = (88.8, 100). We check that KS = 91.2 falls in the
latter interval.
Higher incentives to create in duopoly. It is easy to check thatπS > πm −
π b∗i is equivalent to K > (3
√
10 − 8)θ¯s/13  0.114θ¯s, which is implied by
K > Kˆ  0.121θ¯s.
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